Air gaps, long hailed as the ultimate defense for sensitive data, are under siege according to Black Hat researcher Mordechai Guri. In a compelling presentation, Guri demonstrated multiple innovative methods to exfiltrate information from supposedly isolated computers, shattering the myth of complete offline security. These techniques exploit everyday hardware components, proving that physical disconnection alone cannot guarantee protection in high-stakes environments like government and military networks.
Guri’s BeatCoin malware turns computer speakers into covert transmitters, emitting near-ultrasonic sounds inaudible to humans but detectable by nearby smartphones up to 10 meters away. This allows private keys or other secrets to leak out effortlessly. Even disabling speakers fails, as Fansmitter modulates fan speeds to alter blade frequencies, creating acoustic signals receivable by listening devices within 8 meters. For scenarios without microphones, the Mosquito attack repurposes speakers as rudimentary microphones via GPIO manipulation, enabling ultrasonic data transmission between air-gapped machines.
Electromagnetic exploits further erode air-gap defenses. AirHopper manipulates monitor cables to radiate FM-band signals, capturable by a smartphone’s built-in receiver. GSMem leverages CPU-RAM pathways to generate cellular-like transmissions detectable by basic feature phones, while USBee transforms USB ports into antennas for broad leakage. These methods highlight how standard peripherals become unwitting conduits for data escape.
Faraday cages, designed to block electromagnetic waves, offer no sanctuary either. Guri’s ODINI attack generates low-frequency magnetic fields from CPU cores, penetrating these shields.PowerHammer goes further by inducing parasitic signals on building power lines, tappable by attackers monitoring electrical infrastructure.Such persistence underscores the vulnerability of even fortified setups.
While these attacks assume initial malware infection—often via USB or insiders—real-world precedents like Stuxnet validate the threat. Organizations must layer defenses with anomaly detection, hardware restrictions, and continuous monitoring beyond mere air-gapping. Guri’s work urges a reevaluation of “secure” isolation strategies in an era of sophisticated side-channel threats.
This article has been indexed from CySecurity News – Latest Information Security and Hacking Incidents
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