Anatomy of a Modern Threat: Deconstructing the Figma MCP Vulnerability

Threat researchers recently disclosed a severe vulnerability in a Figma Model Context Protocol (MCP) server, as reported by The Hacker News. While the specific patch is important, the discovery itself serves as a critical wake-up call for every organization rushing to adopt AI. This incident provides a blueprint for a new class of attacks that target the very infrastructure powering the AI Agent Economy.

To understand the risk, we must first look at the mechanics of this emerging threat.

What is MCP and Why is it a Target?

As businesses integrate AI agents, they require a means for these autonomous systems to communicate with existing applications. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a new protocol designed for this purpose, enabling an AI agent to interact with tools like Figma to perform tasks such as creating designs, modifying components, exporting assets, and more.

While powerful, these MCP servers create new, often unmonitored, pathways into sensitive corporate applications. An attacker who can compromise this channel isn’t just bypassing a firewall; they are effectively impersonating a trusted AI agent to manipulate an application from the inside.

Anatomy of the Attack: Abusing the API Channel

The vulnerability allowed for a practical exploit that abused the API’s intended functionality. The exploit chain followed a pattern that leveraged the API channel at every step to turn a legitimate feature into a weapon.

  1. A Specific API Function Was Targeted: The vulnerability was identified in an API function within the MCP server, which was designed specifically for AI agents to retrieve data. This is a perfect example of a new, specialized API endpoint created for AI integration that may lack the mature security oversight of legacy systems.
  2. A Command Was Injected into an API Parameter: The attack vector involved injecting a malicious OS command into a specific API parameter. By passing the command within a data field that the API function was expecting, such as one that specifies a file or resource ID, the malicious payload was delivered in a way that could bypass initial security checks.
  3. Flawed Input Validation Was Exploited: The root cause of

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