From view-only access to container root: five vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs (FIXED)

Overview

As part of our research into Zimbra Collaboration Suite, Rapid7 reported five findings in ONLYOFFICE Docs. An attacker with view-only access to a document can chain vulnerabilities in ONLYOFFICE Docs to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root inside the official DocumentServer container.

The findings also expose server files and document data that the viewer never displays, even when downloading is disabled.

CVE

Finding

CVSS

CVE-2026-113627

DocBuilder native file read and Session JWT forgery

7.1 High

CVE-2026-110385

DocBuilder SaveFile conversion parameter injection and code execution

8.7 High

CVE-2026-97727

Complete-save format path traversal and arbitrary file write

6.5 Medium

CVE-2026-113630

Root-helper command injection

7.8 High

CVE-2026-113631

View-only export of non-rendered document data

6.5 Medium

ONLYOFFICE confirmed on October 23, 2026 that all five findings were fixed in Document Server 10.0. The changelog describes the release's security changes.

Proof-of-concept code is available on the accompanying Github repository.

Product description

ONLYOFFICE Docs provides online viewers and editors for documents, spreadsheets, presentations, forms and PDFs. It supports collaborative editing and can integrate with applications that store and share files.

An integrating application, for example Zimbra Collaboration Suite, supplies an opening configuration identifying the document and the user's permissions, signed with the Browser key. This client-visible credential is referred to below as the Editor JWT. After opening a document, DocumentServer issues a Session JWT for reconnecting and saving.

Incoming service requests, including document-building jobs, are validated using ONLYOFFICE's Inbox JWT key. DocumentServer can also send generated document output to the integrating application's callback URL.

Credit

This assessment and the exploit-chain research were conducted by Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat), Senior Security Researcher at Rapid7. The findings are being disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy.

Testing setup

Rapid7 tested the official onlyoffice/documentserver:9.4.0 image with package onlyoffice-documentserver 9.4.0-129. DocumentServer ran as the ds account. JWT validation remained enabled, and no authentication check, private-address filter, or vendor code was disabled or modified. Browser and Inbox validation used the same effective signing key.

Our analysis of the vendor supplied fixes compares the v9.4.0.129 and v10.0.0.169 tags of ONLYOFFICE/server, ONLYOFFICE/core and ONLYOFFICE/document-server-package. Rapid7 also performed targeted checks on package 10.0.0-169. For the conditional WOPI test on 9.4.0-129, Rapid7 enabled only WOPI_ENABLED=true and left the shipped WOPI IP filter unchanged at its default allow-all rule.

Exploitation was demonstrated only on 9.4.0-129; the broader affected-version range is unknown.

Impact

View-only document access can lead to command execution as ds and then root inside the official container. The two exploit chains use different file-write stages. With WOPI enabled and an attacker-controlled source reachable and permitted by its IP filter, the same DocBuilder authorization failure provides an unauthenticated entry.

Separately, a viewer denied download can obtain a reconstructed DOCX containing custom XML, custom properties and field instructions that the viewer never displayed.

Editor JWT authorizes native file reads and session JWT forgery (CVE-2026-113627)

An attacker with view-only access to a document can use /docbuilder to steal files from the ONLYOFFICE server. In the tested build, this exposed the Session JWT signing key, allowing the attacker to forge credentials containing document keys and permissions that were never granted to the original viewer.

Technical analysis

Prerequisite: The attacker needs a valid Editor JWT for any document and access to /docbuilder. Target files must be readable by ds. The token-forgery step also requires the Session JWT signing key to be in a readable file, as it was in the tested build. No edit, download, print, review, or comment permission is required.

The default-secret branch in getTenantSecret() contains:

switch (type) {
case commonDefines.c_oAscSecretType.Browser:
case commonDefines.c_oAscSecretType.Inbox:
    res = utils.getSecretByElem(cfgSecretInbox); // [0] Shared signing key
break;
// ... other token types omitted ...
}

The branch at [0] selects the same configured signing key for Browser and Inbox tokens.

builderRequest() passes the request to getRequestParams():

const authRes = yield docsCoServer.getRequestParams(ctx, req); // [1] Request JWT validation
if (authRes.isDecoded) {
  cmd.setWithAuthorization(true);
}

At [1], builderRequest() delegates JWT validation to getRequestParams(). That function's query-token branch checks the signature using the Inbox key:

if (tenTokenEnableRequestInbox) {
  res.code = constants.VKEY;
let checkJwtRes;
if (res.params.token) {
// [2] Inbox signature check
checkJwtRes =

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