Taiwan, “Strategic Clarity” and the War Powers: A U.S. Commitment to Taiwan Requires Congressional Buy-In

Read the original article: Taiwan, “Strategic Clarity” and the War Powers: A U.S. Commitment to Taiwan Requires Congressional Buy-In


Recent attention has been given to the United States’s policy toward Taiwan in the event of an attack by the People’s Republic of China. Richard Haass and David Sacks recently argued that the decades-long policy of “strategic ambiguity” has outlived its usefulness and that a policy of “strategic clarity” would be a better option. Strategic ambiguity consists of purposely not declaring “whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China mounted an armed attack” while strategic clarity, in contrast, would make “explicit that the United States would respond to any Chinese use of force against Taiwan.” The argument for the latter is that by committing itself to intervene, the United States can strengthen the deterrent effect of its policy and, therefore, lessen the chance of major war. Uncertainty is one of the most prominent causes of war in international relations, and a policy of strategic ambiguity can thus be seen as an unforced error on the part of the United States. A policy of strategic clarity, in contrast, would much more clearly commit the U.S. to a certain course and—somewhat counterintuitively—reduce the probability of conflict between the U.S. and China. Haass and Sacks summarize their argument as “To Keep the Peace, Make Clear to China That Force Won’t Stand.”

Others, however, disagree with this argument. Taiwan expert Bonnie Glaser, for example, argues that Haass and Sacks’s “proposed solution … would not solve that problem and might even provoke a Chinese attack.” Glaser writes that “[a] clear statement of U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan … could embolden pro-independence constituencies in Taiwan to promote their cause,” thus throwing fuel on the fire and perhaps igniting the very martial conflagration Haass and Sacks seek to avoid. But while much focus of this debate has been put on the international commitment a presidential administration might declare toward Taiwan, little focus has been placed on the credibility of any such declared commitment without clear congressional buy-in. While the president has a broad power to threaten military action, threats need to be perceived by adversaries as credible in order to achieve a deterrent effect. Given the enormous political exposure a president would be risking by engaging in a major conflict unilaterally, the threat to do so absent congressional support would lack significant credibility in the eyes of potential U.S. opponents. Therefore, in order to minimize the possibility of a war over Taiwan, pursuing a policy of strategic clarity requires that Congress make its own policy position clear and unambiguous as well.

Presidents have, of course, broad latitude in declaring U.S. foreign policy commitments and can essentially order the military into combat whenever they see fit, but the political reality is that a president is not likely to risk major combat absent substantial congressional support—most likely through a formal authorization for the use of military force (AUMF). While President Truman entered the Korean War absent formal congressional approval (there was, however, overwhelming congressional support for the intervention), subsequent presidents saw this as a major political mistake and have since entered major combat operations only with explicit authorizing legislation. Regardless of how broadly the Office of Legal Counsel might construe the commander-in-chief power in Article II of the Constitution, Congress would de facto play an enormously important part in any major use of military force decision by the United States. China understands this, and thus the perceived credibility of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan depends partially on Beijing’s perceptions of Congress’s commitment to the island.

Congress has generally been quite supportive of Taiwan—traditionally, even more so than U.S. presidents. Famously, when the executive branch in the 1970s moved toward recognizing the People’s Republic of China and breaking off official relations with Taiwan, Congress both resisted the abrogation of the U.S.-Republic of China mutual defense treaty and then

 

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Read the original article: Taiwan, “Strategic Clarity” and the War Powers: A U.S. Commitment to Taiwan Requires Congressional Buy-In

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