Proposed Cybercrime Treaty’s International Cooperation Provisions Could Let Tyrants Run Amok

This is the third segment in EFF’s series on the proposed UN Cybercrime Convention focusing on Chapter V, International Cooperation. Read Part I for a quick snap of what ins and outs of the zero draft, and Part II for a deep dive on Chapter IV, domestic surveillance powers.

The United Nations Headquarters in New York City is poised to become the epicenter of one of the most concerning global debates affecting human rights in the digital age. Starting August 21, delegates from around the world will gather for an intense two-week session to scrutinize the highly controversial “zero draft” of a UN Cybercrime Convention that could compel states to redefine their own criminal and surveillance laws on a global scale. 

Though the first negotiated text of the proposed convention, the “zero draft” is deeply flawed, the principle that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” applies here. EFF will be attending the sixth session in New York to participate in those discussions as an observer. 

In previous discussions, we addressed concerns over ambiguous surveillance powers and inadequate safeguards. Now we will delve into the heavily debated chapter on international cooperation. For clarity and depth, our analysis of this chapter will span two posts. This first post covers the historical context of international cooperation mechanisms, the zero draft’s approach in Chapter V, the scope of cooperation, and protection of personal data. In the next post, we’ll continue our analysis of Chapter V of the zero draft, addressing the broad demands of mutual le

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