Six data protection myths cloud-native teams need to stop believing

Cloud teams spend a lot of time and money designing applications to withstand failure. Replication, versioning, snapshots, and infrastructure as code (IaC) keep applications available and cloud environments more resilient. The trouble starts when teams assume those same capabilities will also allow them to recover from a cyberattack.

In September 2026, Microsoft detailed an incident in which attackers used compromised Azure identities to delete cloud resources and target recovery protections. In a destructive sequence lasting about seven minutes, attackers attempted more than 100 deletions of storage accounts and deleted most of them. The attack shows how easily an attacker with sufficient privileges can turn cloud management capabilities against the organization.

In talking with customers, I’ve learned they typically take one of two paths. Some spend heavily on disaster recovery because they’re worried about the next hyperscaler outage, while others assume that data sitting in AWS or Azure is already sufficiently protected. Both sides often misunderstand what cloud-native resilience tools were designed to do. Those tools behave differently when the disruption comes from an attacker instead of an outage.

Here are six misconceptions I hear most.

Myth 1: Amazon S3 versioning is the same as backup

Versioning is useful when someone accidentally overwrites or deletes an object, but not when an attacker has your credentials. In January 2025, researchers at Halcyon documented the Codefinger ransomware campaign, in which attackers used compromised AWS credentials and Amazon S3’s server-side encryption with customer-provided keys (SSE-C) to make data inaccessible, then threatened deletion through S3 life-cycle policies.

You should know who can change the controls protecting your data, particularly when the credentials used to access production can also alter life-cycle policies or other S3 settings. Restrict those permissions and use protections such as Object Lock or MFA Delete to limit the damage a compromised identity can cause.

Myth 2: Multi-region replication protects me

Replication keeps applications and data available when infrastructure fails, which makes it an important part of cloud resilience. But a copy in another region isn’t automatically a clean copy.

Whether you’re using Amazon S3 replication, Azure Storage georedundancy or another cloud service, replication is designed primarily for availability, not protection against every form of data loss. Depending on the service and configuration, corrupted or encrypted data may be replicated along with legitimate changes. And deletion behavior varies across services. Find out what your replicas do when the original changes or disappears. For critical data, keep recovery copies in a separate account that production credentials cannot reach.

Myth 3: Snapshots are good enough

Snapshots have the same issue. Teams can have plenty of snapshots and still find during an attack that they cannot recover from it. Code Spaces, a code-hosting service, had this problem in 2014, when an attacker gained access to its AWS control panel and deleted data, backups, machine configurations and snapshots. The company shut down within days.

If an attacker who compromises a production account can also reach the recovery snapshots, the attacker can delete them too. Lock your recovery snapshots so no one can delete them before their retention period ends, not even an admin.

Myth 4: IaC means we can rebuild anything

Infrastructure as code makes it easier to recreate cloud environments quickly and consistently, but that only gets you so far. For example, Terraform can rebuild the database infrastructure, but restoring customer records, transaction history, and other critical information requires a separate data recovery solution.

Recovery tests need to go further than redeploying the infrastructure. I recommend restoring the data the app depends on, then checking that the restored environment works.

Myth 5: We’re stateless, so we don’t really have data to protect

Applications described as “stateless” still write data somewhere and usually in several places. Customer records may be in a Postgres database and objects in Amazon S3. Other critical information might live in DynamoDB, Redis, Snowflake, or Apache Kafka.

You should map the services each application writes to. Decide what data needs to be recoverable, and make sure someone is responsible for protecting it. Otherwise, important data can fall through the cracks between teams.

Myth 6: Our data is ephemeral, so it doesn’t matter if we lose it

Some data looks expendable until you need it. Audit logs are a good example. During an incident, security teams use them to determine what an attacker did, what was affected, and whether it is safe to start restoring.

Rather than assuming that data is disposable, ask what losing it would cost. Could it stall

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