The Falcon cyberespionage framework, formerly known as XG, targets government systems by exploiting web browsers to exploit sensitive information and maintain covert access to compromised systems.
By utilizing malicious JavaScript and deceptive browser extensions, the framework monitors user activity, collects credentials and has access to confidential communications without relying on conventional malware execution.
It is reported in Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 report published on November 11, 2026 that Falcon was used between March and May of 2026 in campaigns targeting government entities in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries.
Ministry of foreign affairs, defense and interior, police departments, intelligence agencies, military entities, and government email systems were affected by the vulnerability.
As it operates within the browser environment, the framework is difficult to identify through traditional endpoint security monitoring, which makes its activities more difficult to detect. Instead of using suspicious executable files, attackers inject malicious JavaScript into legitimate web applications and webmail portals in an effort to conceal their activities.
In the case of a compromised website, the browser retrieves the malicious script from the Falcon command-and-control (C2) infrastructure when the targeted user visits the compromised site. Researchers have observed that the framework generates an implant separately for each browser session. This implant consists of two JavaScript components containing configuration details and functions for communicating and executing commands.
An XOR operation of a single byte is performed to obfuscate the combined script before delivery, converting its contents into a series of numerical values that are decoded and executed within the browser. A 32-character session identifier, stored locally in the browser, and in cookies, is also used for persistent tracking. In order to blend in with ordinary browser data, the malicious entries employ a naming convention mimicking Baidu Analytics identifiers.
Falcon extensions are equipped with the capability of storing the identifier within their extension storage when installed. For command-and-control communication, the implant establishes a WebSocket connection to the attacker's server while the compromised webpage is available. In order to maintain the connection, a periodic heartbeat message is sent to maintain the connection and an AES-256-CBC encryption system is used to protect data exchanged with RSA-based key negotiation.
In addition to the framework's built-in features, the Comet communication method provides a fallback mechanism for executing arbitrary JavaScript commands, transmitting collected information, and managing compromised browser sessions once connected. Through its built-in functions, attackers are able to control infected browsers effectively by exfiltrating data, labeling sessions, and receiving operator notifications via Telegram.
It was also found that Falcon and PeckBirdy, a scripting framework previously described by Trend Micro, share many similarities. In light of the shared URL structures, payload delivery methods, communication protocols and session storage conventions, Unit 42 concluded with high confidence that both frameworks are variants of the same underlying toolset.
Falcon Extension Expands Surveillance Across Browsers and Internal Systems
As part of Falcon's broader control over compromised browsers, the company uses dedicated Chrome and Firefox extensions, which in turn conceal itself as a legitimate PDF viewer called "PDF Viewer" and request 40 permissions. These permissions include access to browser credentials, cookies, browsing histories, downloads, and network activity, among others.
There is no indication as to how these extensions are installed by the operators, however the management panel appeared to contain tools for silent installation. As soon as the extension is activated, it tracks activity across visited websites and collects information through background processes. It is capable of capturing Gmail, Discord, Zalo chat databases, and X direct messages.
The system can also monitor clipboard activity as well as intercept web requests containing text or JSON data. Collected information is temporarily stored and sent to the command server. Another noteworthy feature allows attackers to use the victim's browser as a proxy.
Operators can send requests using session cookies and stored credentials to authenticate a browser session and gain access to internal resources under the victim's name by using stored credentials.
Moreover, Falcon is capable of intercepting selected downloads, cancelling the original request, and redirecting the user to an attacker-controlled file while retaining the original filename. These capabilities increase the risk of account hijacking and further malware delivery. Between March and May of 2026, Unit 42 has identified
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