7 Privilege Management Mistakes That Put Business Data at Risk
Every growing business has at least one lingering privilege management issue. It’s not because your team is lazy. It’s because organizations grow, restructure and hire far faster than manual access processes can keep up.
When roles evolve or contractors come and go, permissions accumulate behind the scenes—creating invisible attack paths.
In this post, we list the seven most common privilege access mistakes based on our experience and expertise as a data security and cybersecurity company. We’ll also look at how they show up in real‑world breaches and explain why the underlying causes are organizational rather than technical.
When onboarding a new employee or contractor, it’s tempting to grant broad access “just in case” to avoid bottlenecks. These well‑intentioned shortcuts dramatically increase your attack surface and allow a single compromised account to access sensitive data.
Real‑World Examples
Dropbox Sign breach (May 2024) – Attackers exploited a single service account with broad privileges. Because the account was over‑provisioned, they accessed the entire customer database, including emails, hashed passwords, API keys, OAuth tokens and MFA details.
Tesla new‑hire data theft (January 2021) – A newly hired engineer was given access to 26,000 proprietary files within days of joining the company. The employee copied manufacturing and software source code to his personal Dropbox account in his first week. This happened because onboarding teams granted access in advance.
OWASP statistics – The OWASP Foundation has recorded hundreds of thousands of broken access control vulnerabilities in contributed projects, largely driven by over‑permissioned roles and service accounts.
Root Causes
ORGANIZATIONAL DRIVER
WHY IT HAPPENS
Large, fragmented organizations
IT and HR operate in silos. Provisioning teams default to pre-built “role templates” that bundle excessive permissions to minimize back-and-forth. In large headcounts, individual
[…] Content was cut in order to protect the source.Please visit the source for the rest of the article.
This article has been indexed from Security Boulevard
Used to monitor number of Google Analytics server requests when using Google Tag Manager
1 minute
_gid
ID used to identify users for 24 hours after last activity
24 hours
_ga_
ID used to identify users
2 years
_gali
Used by Google Analytics to determine which links on a page are being clicked
30 seconds
__utmx
Used to determine whether a user is included in an A / B or Multivariate test.
18 months
__utmv
Contains custom information set by the web developer via the _setCustomVar method in Google Analytics. This cookie is updated every time new data is sent to the Google Analytics server.
2 years after last activity
__utmz
Contains information about the traffic source or campaign that directed user to the website. The cookie is set when the GA.js javascript is loaded and updated when data is sent to the Google Anaytics server
6 months after last activity
__utmc
Used only with old Urchin versions of Google Analytics and not with GA.js. Was used to distinguish between new sessions and visits at the end of a session.
End of session (browser)
__utmb
Used to distinguish new sessions and visits. This cookie is set when the GA.js javascript library is loaded and there is no existing __utmb cookie. The cookie is updated every time data is sent to the Google Analytics server.
30 minutes after last activity
__utmt
Used to monitor number of Google Analytics server requests
10 minutes
__utma
ID used to identify users and sessions
2 years after last activity
_gac_
Contains information related to marketing campaigns of the user. These are shared with Google AdWords / Google Ads when the Google Ads and Google Analytics accounts are linked together.
90 days
Jetpack's built-in visitor analytics. It records page views, referring sites, search terms, and outbound link clicks, and also carries the shared visitor-tracking library used by Jetpack Instant Search and WooCommerce Analytics.